Erik, this is an outstanding and deeply learned reflection on Jürgen Habermas—easily one of the most philosophically substantive responses I’ve seen so far (or ever will see). Your treatment of the Habermas–Schelling lineage, the Heidegger problem, and the Kyoto School parallel is especially compelling, and your willingness to engage Ken Wilber with both respect and rigor is refreshing. This is the kind of serious, integrative philosophical work our current moment needs. There is a great deal here that deserves careful digestion, and I’d like to return with a more detailed response soon—particularly around the relationship between nondual realization and communicative rationality. Congratulations on an excellent piece of philosophical reflection! Thank you. 🙏
Hey Brad, I had a feeling you would enjoy this one. I had been working on several parts of this essay, when I heard he passed. That said, this was actually my MA thesis that was being nurtured by an old professor of mine that I never pursued due to various life circumstances. Its actually a continuation of his PhD work he had done under the Canadian/British theologians Gregory Baum & Charles Davis. Their work might be of interest https://www.google.ca/books/edition/From_Critical_Theology_to_a_Critical_The/SONtz-kdXeUC?hl=en&gbpv=0
Hey Erik—thanks again for your thoughtful response, and I’m glad you appreciated some of what my essay was attempting to do. Overall, I want to reiterate how much I appreciate the depth, care, and philosophical seriousness of your essay. It’s really fantastic—I learned a great deal from it. It’s clear this has been a long-gestating project for you, and it shows in the quality of your presentation, the depth of your argument, and your writing.
I did not initially engage your treatment of Adi Da because I wanted to focus on what I see as the exceptional strength of your overall analysis. But in revisiting that section more carefully, I realize I need to be more direct on this point. After all, I wrote an entire book, In God’s Company: Transcending the Fear of Guru-Cults in the Integral Age (2024), addressing precisely the kinds of assumptions that are operative in your evaluation.
Let me start by saying that I think your structural concern is both serious and worth pursuing—especially regarding collective praxis, shadow, and communicative accountability. I fully agree that integral communities must be able to “show up” and “clean up” at the collective level, and that realization does not exempt anyone from the demands of ethical and political responsibility. In that sense, your appeal to Habermas—and to figures like Roger Walsh—is entirely appropriate and important.
At the same time, I think your use of the Adi Da example carries more argumentative weight than it can bear, because it assumes as settled a narrative that is, in fact, deeply contested. What you are doing in that passage is philosophically sophisticated in one sense and vulnerable in another. The sophisticated move is structural: you argue that if a framework posits a transpersonal or nondual ground that exceeds ordinary evaluation, it introduces an accountability problem. That is a legitimate Habermasian concern, and I take it seriously.
But you then anchor that structural critique in a historically loaded example that is simply assumed rather than interrogated. In other words, the allegations about Adi Da Samraj are treated as already “credibly” established, and from there it is concluded that Wilber’s endorsement reveals an intrinsic weakness in the AQAL framework. But that move only works if the factual premise is granted. And I don’t think that premise can be assumed without further examination—especially given that it is precisely the subject of sustained critique in my own work.
So the issue, as I see it, is twofold. First, you may be entirely right that integral communities need stronger forms of collective accountability, shadow-work, and communicative clarity. That is a fair and important line of inquiry. But second, it does not follow that Adi Da serves as a clear example of “genuine realization coexisting with abusive dysfunction,” because that description already presupposes the truth of an interpretation that must itself be argued, not merely repeated.
Otherwise, the argument risks becoming circular: the teacher is taken to be abusive because dominant cultural discourse says so, and that discourse is then confirmed by treating the case as self-evident evidence. From my perspective, that is not a neutral Habermasian procedure. It is the importation of culturally dominant judgments into the analysis under the guise of procedural accountability—without subjecting those judgments themselves to critical scrutiny.
This is where I see a deeper issue emerging. Your framing brings together several distinct questions that I think need to be carefully differentiated. One question is whether contemplative realization guarantees ethical maturity or political wisdom. Clearly, it does not. At the same time, I would qualify this by noting that what is often called “waking up” includes a range of state-realizations that fall short of full Enlightenment (or Complete Divine Self-Realization). In that sense, I see a potential conflation between partial awakening and full realization—a distinction I address more fully in Meta-Perennial Philosophia: Integrating Evolution and Enlightenment (2026), and which also underlies my effort to differentiate (without separating) Becoming and Being.
Another issue you rightly bring forward is whether communities require structures of critique, dialogue, and accountability. Clearly, they do. But a third question is whether every so-called “controversial” spiritual teacher should be interpreted through the default modern suspicion narrative. That does not automatically follow.
And this is precisely where my work in In God’s Company becomes relevant. The book is not a defense of bypassing accountability, nor an attempt to exempt spiritual teachers from critique. It is an examination of how modern secular frameworks often lack the conceptual resources to interpret guru-disciple relationships except through categories like manipulation, dependency, and abuse. So when a case like Adi Da is introduced as evidence, I think it is essential that the interpretive frame itself be brought into question. As it stands, your reading appears to grant little or no weight to alternative accounts of Adi Da’s legitimacy or authenticity—including forms of evaluation and recognition that Wilber himself discusses in A Sociable God (1982) and Spiritual Choices (1987). Let alone overlooking the incredible importance of Spirit-Transmission.
In that sense, I would suggest that the Habermasian demand for accountability must cut both ways. It must apply not only to claims of realization, but also to the communicative and cultural processes through which those claims are publicly judged. Otherwise, we risk creating an asymmetry in which spiritual claims are rigorously scrutinized, while the narratives used to evaluate them are simply taken for granted.
From a broader philosophical perspective, this is also where figures like Schelling and Heidegger become relevant to the discussion. Both, in different ways, pointed to the limits of rational or discursive frameworks in accounting for the ground of disclosure itself. Schelling argued that reason cannot fully account for the fact that Being is at all, while Heidegger warned that the reduction of reality to what can be publicly articulated risks obscuring the very condition that makes such articulation possible. While neither provides a political solution—and Heidegger’s own failures remain a cautionary example—they do reinforce the need to avoid collapsing questions of Being into the domain of communicative validation alone (or the realm of Becoming).
So while I continue to find your essay very compelling, brilliant even—especially in its emphasis on collective praxis and communicative integrity—I would want to pause at the point where a contested case is treated as settled evidence of a structural flaw. I think that is precisely where further philosophical work is needed, and where a more sustained dialogue could be especially fruitful.
I genuinely appreciate the conversation, and I’d welcome continuing it. Rock on!
Hey Brad, thank you for this fuller and more direct engagement — this is the conversation I was hoping for.
Your epistemological counter — that the Habermasian accountability demand must cut both ways, scrutinizing not just claims to realization but also the cultural frameworks used to evaluate them — is precisely the kind of concern I take seriously. And it points to something I want to be direct about: I'm not arguing from within the dominant secular academic dismissal of waking-up. That closure is actually part of why I left academia and religious studies altogether. I experienced it firsthand — the reflexive treatment of contemplative claims as epistemically inadmissible before examination, the inability of the institutional framework to hold the questions I was actually asking.
The same asymmetry even applies to Habermas — who gets smeared as hostile to religion when his work is anything but. What he's actually offering is the conditions under which both secular and religious voices can meet without one simply colonizing the other. That's precisely why he's useful for the question of collective praxis in integral communities.
That said, I'd love to connect and hear about your time with Adi Da and Wilber directly at some point. I sent you my email in a direct chat.
Hi Jonathan, Its a long one. That said, its been in the works for a rather long time too. Its a subject that was being nurtured by an old professor of mine in Montreal who recently pasted away & was encouraging me to pursued it through graduate studies. Its essentially an extension of his work in this book on Habermas: https://www.google.ca/books/edition/From_Critical_Theology_to_a_Critical_The/SONtz-kdXeUC?hl=en&gbpv=0
I resonate deeply with what you are trying to uncover here, the problems you are grappling with. Please keep pushing on this, it feels really important. One major insight that came to me while reading is that much of the metamodern discourse seems to focus on the healthy relationship between the modern and postmodern and it is important, especially for the academy, but the larger project (and the genuinely integral one) is actually the healthy relationship between the rational and the prerational, to ensure our survival... If that makes sense. On any case, thank you and please keep going.
![Integral [+] Facticity](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yhcJ!,w_120,h_120,c_fill,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff8458843-3278-4fcc-accc-17ad21352205_1280x1280.png)
Erik, this is an outstanding and deeply learned reflection on Jürgen Habermas—easily one of the most philosophically substantive responses I’ve seen so far (or ever will see). Your treatment of the Habermas–Schelling lineage, the Heidegger problem, and the Kyoto School parallel is especially compelling, and your willingness to engage Ken Wilber with both respect and rigor is refreshing. This is the kind of serious, integrative philosophical work our current moment needs. There is a great deal here that deserves careful digestion, and I’d like to return with a more detailed response soon—particularly around the relationship between nondual realization and communicative rationality. Congratulations on an excellent piece of philosophical reflection! Thank you. 🙏
Hey Brad, I had a feeling you would enjoy this one. I had been working on several parts of this essay, when I heard he passed. That said, this was actually my MA thesis that was being nurtured by an old professor of mine that I never pursued due to various life circumstances. Its actually a continuation of his PhD work he had done under the Canadian/British theologians Gregory Baum & Charles Davis. Their work might be of interest https://www.google.ca/books/edition/From_Critical_Theology_to_a_Critical_The/SONtz-kdXeUC?hl=en&gbpv=0
Hey Erik—thanks again for your thoughtful response, and I’m glad you appreciated some of what my essay was attempting to do. Overall, I want to reiterate how much I appreciate the depth, care, and philosophical seriousness of your essay. It’s really fantastic—I learned a great deal from it. It’s clear this has been a long-gestating project for you, and it shows in the quality of your presentation, the depth of your argument, and your writing.
I did not initially engage your treatment of Adi Da because I wanted to focus on what I see as the exceptional strength of your overall analysis. But in revisiting that section more carefully, I realize I need to be more direct on this point. After all, I wrote an entire book, In God’s Company: Transcending the Fear of Guru-Cults in the Integral Age (2024), addressing precisely the kinds of assumptions that are operative in your evaluation.
Let me start by saying that I think your structural concern is both serious and worth pursuing—especially regarding collective praxis, shadow, and communicative accountability. I fully agree that integral communities must be able to “show up” and “clean up” at the collective level, and that realization does not exempt anyone from the demands of ethical and political responsibility. In that sense, your appeal to Habermas—and to figures like Roger Walsh—is entirely appropriate and important.
At the same time, I think your use of the Adi Da example carries more argumentative weight than it can bear, because it assumes as settled a narrative that is, in fact, deeply contested. What you are doing in that passage is philosophically sophisticated in one sense and vulnerable in another. The sophisticated move is structural: you argue that if a framework posits a transpersonal or nondual ground that exceeds ordinary evaluation, it introduces an accountability problem. That is a legitimate Habermasian concern, and I take it seriously.
But you then anchor that structural critique in a historically loaded example that is simply assumed rather than interrogated. In other words, the allegations about Adi Da Samraj are treated as already “credibly” established, and from there it is concluded that Wilber’s endorsement reveals an intrinsic weakness in the AQAL framework. But that move only works if the factual premise is granted. And I don’t think that premise can be assumed without further examination—especially given that it is precisely the subject of sustained critique in my own work.
So the issue, as I see it, is twofold. First, you may be entirely right that integral communities need stronger forms of collective accountability, shadow-work, and communicative clarity. That is a fair and important line of inquiry. But second, it does not follow that Adi Da serves as a clear example of “genuine realization coexisting with abusive dysfunction,” because that description already presupposes the truth of an interpretation that must itself be argued, not merely repeated.
Otherwise, the argument risks becoming circular: the teacher is taken to be abusive because dominant cultural discourse says so, and that discourse is then confirmed by treating the case as self-evident evidence. From my perspective, that is not a neutral Habermasian procedure. It is the importation of culturally dominant judgments into the analysis under the guise of procedural accountability—without subjecting those judgments themselves to critical scrutiny.
This is where I see a deeper issue emerging. Your framing brings together several distinct questions that I think need to be carefully differentiated. One question is whether contemplative realization guarantees ethical maturity or political wisdom. Clearly, it does not. At the same time, I would qualify this by noting that what is often called “waking up” includes a range of state-realizations that fall short of full Enlightenment (or Complete Divine Self-Realization). In that sense, I see a potential conflation between partial awakening and full realization—a distinction I address more fully in Meta-Perennial Philosophia: Integrating Evolution and Enlightenment (2026), and which also underlies my effort to differentiate (without separating) Becoming and Being.
Another issue you rightly bring forward is whether communities require structures of critique, dialogue, and accountability. Clearly, they do. But a third question is whether every so-called “controversial” spiritual teacher should be interpreted through the default modern suspicion narrative. That does not automatically follow.
And this is precisely where my work in In God’s Company becomes relevant. The book is not a defense of bypassing accountability, nor an attempt to exempt spiritual teachers from critique. It is an examination of how modern secular frameworks often lack the conceptual resources to interpret guru-disciple relationships except through categories like manipulation, dependency, and abuse. So when a case like Adi Da is introduced as evidence, I think it is essential that the interpretive frame itself be brought into question. As it stands, your reading appears to grant little or no weight to alternative accounts of Adi Da’s legitimacy or authenticity—including forms of evaluation and recognition that Wilber himself discusses in A Sociable God (1982) and Spiritual Choices (1987). Let alone overlooking the incredible importance of Spirit-Transmission.
In that sense, I would suggest that the Habermasian demand for accountability must cut both ways. It must apply not only to claims of realization, but also to the communicative and cultural processes through which those claims are publicly judged. Otherwise, we risk creating an asymmetry in which spiritual claims are rigorously scrutinized, while the narratives used to evaluate them are simply taken for granted.
From a broader philosophical perspective, this is also where figures like Schelling and Heidegger become relevant to the discussion. Both, in different ways, pointed to the limits of rational or discursive frameworks in accounting for the ground of disclosure itself. Schelling argued that reason cannot fully account for the fact that Being is at all, while Heidegger warned that the reduction of reality to what can be publicly articulated risks obscuring the very condition that makes such articulation possible. While neither provides a political solution—and Heidegger’s own failures remain a cautionary example—they do reinforce the need to avoid collapsing questions of Being into the domain of communicative validation alone (or the realm of Becoming).
So while I continue to find your essay very compelling, brilliant even—especially in its emphasis on collective praxis and communicative integrity—I would want to pause at the point where a contested case is treated as settled evidence of a structural flaw. I think that is precisely where further philosophical work is needed, and where a more sustained dialogue could be especially fruitful.
I genuinely appreciate the conversation, and I’d welcome continuing it. Rock on!
Hey Brad, thank you for this fuller and more direct engagement — this is the conversation I was hoping for.
Your epistemological counter — that the Habermasian accountability demand must cut both ways, scrutinizing not just claims to realization but also the cultural frameworks used to evaluate them — is precisely the kind of concern I take seriously. And it points to something I want to be direct about: I'm not arguing from within the dominant secular academic dismissal of waking-up. That closure is actually part of why I left academia and religious studies altogether. I experienced it firsthand — the reflexive treatment of contemplative claims as epistemically inadmissible before examination, the inability of the institutional framework to hold the questions I was actually asking.
The same asymmetry even applies to Habermas — who gets smeared as hostile to religion when his work is anything but. What he's actually offering is the conditions under which both secular and religious voices can meet without one simply colonizing the other. That's precisely why he's useful for the question of collective praxis in integral communities.
That said, I'd love to connect and hear about your time with Adi Da and Wilber directly at some point. I sent you my email in a direct chat.
I didn’t/couldn’t read all of this, but I’m glad to know it’s here.
Hi Jonathan, Its a long one. That said, its been in the works for a rather long time too. Its a subject that was being nurtured by an old professor of mine in Montreal who recently pasted away & was encouraging me to pursued it through graduate studies. Its essentially an extension of his work in this book on Habermas: https://www.google.ca/books/edition/From_Critical_Theology_to_a_Critical_The/SONtz-kdXeUC?hl=en&gbpv=0
I resonate deeply with what you are trying to uncover here, the problems you are grappling with. Please keep pushing on this, it feels really important. One major insight that came to me while reading is that much of the metamodern discourse seems to focus on the healthy relationship between the modern and postmodern and it is important, especially for the academy, but the larger project (and the genuinely integral one) is actually the healthy relationship between the rational and the prerational, to ensure our survival... If that makes sense. On any case, thank you and please keep going.